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Faith and Martyrdom: The Tragedy of 
Aaron Swartz 
Austin C. Murnane* 
 
“[A]nd if you will not tell of his martyrdom, tell at 
least of his faith.” 
-Oscar Wilde, The Portrait of Mr. W. H. (1889) 
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 11, 2013, Taren Stinebrickner-Kauffman found her 
partner, Aaron Swartz, hanging in the couple’s apartment in 
Brooklyn, New York.1  Swartz had committed suicide.2  He was 26 
years old.3 
                                                                                                             
*  J.D., 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2006, United States Naval 
Academy.  The Author would like to thank the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & 
Entertainment Law Journal staff, especially Tiffany Mahmood, for their hard work and 
patience throughout the editorial process. 
1 See, e.g., John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, 
Apparently a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/
technology/aaron-swartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html?_r=0; Michael Martinez, 
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At the age of 14, Swartz had coauthored the programming 
language specification that came to be known as Rich Site 
Summary (RSS) 1.0.4  He also formed his own company, which 
merged with the news service Reddit, and co-founded the 
advocacy organization Demand Progress.5  Despite dropping out of 
college after deciding that Stanford lacked the intellectual rigor he 
craved, he earned a position as a fellow at Harvard University’s 
Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics.6  But at the time of his death, 
Swartz was also under federal indictment for wire fraud, computer 
fraud, unlawfully obtaining information from a protected 
computer, and recklessly damaging a protected computer.7 
“He was killed by the government,” said Swartz’s father, 
Robert Swartz, at Swartz’s funeral.8  This was one of many 
accusations leveled against the United States Attorney’s Office 
(USAO) for the District of Massachusetts.  The Massachusetts 
USAO had indicted Swartz for hacking into the non-profit 
academic journal service JSTOR using an internet connection at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT” or “the 
Institute”).9  At a memorial service for Swartz in March 2013, 
                                                                                                             
Internet Prodigy, Activist Aaron Swartz Commits Suicide, CNN (Mar. 7, 2013, 11:41 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/12/us/new-york-reddit-founder-suicide. 
2 See Martinez, supra note 1. 
3 See Schwartz, supra note 1. 
4 See id.; see also Aaron Swartz, Request for Comments No. 3870, 
‘application/rdf+xml’ Media Type Registration, INTERNET SOC’Y NETWORK WORKING 
GRP. (Sept. 2004), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3870. 
5 See Schwartz, supra note 1; Aaron Swartz Biography, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aaron-swartz (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). 
6 See Schwartz, supra note 1; RSS Creator Aaron Swartz Dead at 26, HARVARD 
MAG., Jan. 14, 2013, http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/01/rss-creator-aaron-swartz-dead-
at-26. 
7 Superseding Indictment of Aaron Swartz at 1, United States v. Swartz, No. 11-CR-
10260-NMG, 2012 WL 4341933 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Superseding 
Indictment]. 
8 Sandra Guy, Aaron Swartz Was ‘Killed by Government,’ Father Says at Funeral, 
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013, www.suntimes.com/business/17594002-420/aaron-
swartz-memorialized-at-service.html. 
9 Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 1. 
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Stinebrickner-Kauffman alleged that the prosecutors had engaged 
in “malfeasance.”10 
Swartz’s supporters further criticized the prosecution.  
Professor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School described the case 
against Swartz as a failure of the legal system.11  Other academics 
made similar accusations.12  Swartz received posthumous awards 
from the American Library Association and the Internet Society.13  
Some fans took more dramatic action, targeting the prosecutors 
and MIT with hate mail, cyber attacks, and a hoax report of a 
shooting on the MIT campus.14 
Swartz’s defense attorneys, Elliot R. Peters and Daniel Purcell, 
wrote a letter to the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) at 
the Massachusetts USAO, accusing Swartz’s prosecutors of 
professional misconduct.15  Peters and Purcell alleged that 
prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence by failing to disclose 
information concerning the amount of time the government took to 
                                                                                                             
10 Taren Stinebrickner-Kauffman, MIT Memorial Service, TARENSK (Mar. 12, 2013), 
http://tarensk.tumblr.com/post/45281114505/mit-memorial-service. 
11 See Tim Wu, How the Legal System Failed Aaron Swartz—And Us, NEW YORKER, 
Jan. 14, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/everyone-
interesting-is-a-felon.html. 
12 See, e.g., David Amsden, The Brilliant Life and Tragic Death of Aaron Swartz, 
ROLLING STONE, Feb. 15, 2013, http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-brilliant-
life-and-tragic-death-of-aaron-swartz-20130215 (“[T]he federal government had . . . been 
unrelenting in its quest to ensure that his punishment would be severe.”); Transcript: 
Lawrence Lessig on “Aaron’s Laws—Law and Justice in a Digital Age,” CORRENTEWIRE 
(Mar. 1, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://www.correntewire.com/transcript_lawrence_lessig_on_ 
aarons_laws_law_and_justice_in_a_digital_age [hereinafter Lessig on Aaron’s Laws] 
(“Now, you don’t need to believe that Aaron was right to see why what the government 
did here was wrong.”). 
13 See Keith Michael Fiels, A Memorial Resolution Honoring Aaron Swartz, 2013 ALA 
MEMORIAL #5 (2013); Inductees, Internet Hall of Fame Innovator Aaron Swartz, 
Posthumous Recipient, THE INTERNET SOCIETY (2013), available at http://internethallof
fame.org/inductees/aaron-swartz. 
14 See Derek J. Anderson, MIT Gunman Hoax Linked to Aaron Swartz’s Suicide, 
According to Top School Official, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2013, http://www.boston
.com/metrodesk/2013/02/27/mit-gunman-hoax-linked-aaron-swartz-suicide-according-
top-school-official/YvOMMxJ81eAbhrz4dTfErN/story.html. 
15 Letter from Elliot R. Peters and Daniel Purcell, Counsel for Aaron Swartz, to Robin 
C. Ashton, Counsel, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 28, 2013) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Peters Letter]. 
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apply for a search warrant on one of Swartz’s laptops.16  They also 
accused prosecutors of abusing their discretion by offering a plea 
bargain of less than six months imprisonment, while charging 
Swartz with crimes that would likely carry seven years in prison if 
he were convicted.17 
I. BLAMING THE CFAA 
In addition to blaming the Massachusetts USAO, Swartz’s 
supporters also criticized the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA)18—the law articulating the computer crimes with which 
Swartz was charged.19  Critics referred to the law as overbroad, 
vague, redundant, and an antiquated relic of the 1980s.20  In 
response to Swartz’s suicide, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren and 
Senator Ron Wyden proposed “Aaron’s Law,” a bill intended to 
amend and reform the CFAA.21 
The angry accusations that Swartz’s family, friends, and 
supporters made are completely understandable given the terrible 
nature of their loss.  However, few of these accusations reflect the 
reality of Swartz’s case, intellectual property law, the CFAA, or 
the interests these laws protect.  Although United States v. Swartz22 
provides prosecutors, defense attorneys, and intellectual property 
lawyers with some important lessons, it was not an unethical 
application of an unjust law. 
The tragedy of Aaron Swartz’s death should instead remind all 
attorneys in the criminal justice system of the serious, damaging 
effects that a criminal prosecution can have on a defendant’s 
mental health.  It should inspire prosecutors and defense attorneys 
alike to consider these health effects with great sensitivity, and 
                                                                                                             
16 Id. at 1–6. 
17 Id. at 6. 
18 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
19 See Zoe Lofgren & Ron Wyden, Introducing Aaron’s Law, a Desperately Needed 
Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WIRED (June 20, 2013, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/06/aarons-law-is-finally-here. 
20 Id. 
21 See Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013). 
22 945 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D. Mass. 2013). 
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reach out when necessary to the resources that can alleviate the 
consequences of depression and related illness.  Unfortunately, 
these lessons, if they have been learned at all, have been 
overshadowed by other reactions to Swartz’s death.  In the year 
since Swartz’s suicide, there has been a regrettable lack of 
initiatives that might prevent the recurrence of such a terrible loss. 
II. ARGUMENT/RESOLUTION: THE WRONG LESSONS 
Critics of the Swartz prosecution often overlook three 
important aspects of the case.23  The first is that Swartz caused real 
damage to information systems and risked seriously harming 
interests that deserve protection under the Constitution and as a 
matter of public policy.24  The second is that the CFAA, despite its 
obvious flaws, was well-suited to prevent the serious harm Swartz 
almost succeeded in committing.25  Finally, although neither MIT 
nor JSTOR actively participated in or encouraged the Swartz 
prosecution, nothing about their actions or inactions indicates that 
the prosecution itself was unjust.26  
A. Swartz’s Harm 
Some critics of the prosecution claimed, after his suicide, that 
Swartz’s actions did not deserve punishment because he had not 
caused any harm.  For example, Columbia Law Professor Tim Wu, 
writing the day before Swartz’s funeral, described Swartz’s actions 
as follows: 
The act was harmless—not in the sense of 
hypothetical damages or the circular logic of 
deterrence theory (that’s lawyerly logic), but in 
John Stuart Mill’s sense, meaning that there was no 
actual physical harm, nor actual economic harm.  
                                                                                                             
23 See, e.g., Wu, supra note 11. 
24 See infra notes 28–70. 
25 See infra notes 72–132. 
26 See infra notes 135–150. 
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The leak was found and plugged; JSTOR suffered 
no actual economic loss.27 
Wu and others were probably not aware at the time of the 
funeral of exactly what Swartz had been charged with doing—
indeed, what Swartz had admitted doing.  Any evaluation of the 
prosecutors’ decisions ought to consider the extent of Swartz’s 
actions against the MIT and JSTOR networks, the interests he 
threatened, and his intent. 
Swartz apparently conducted three distinct series of cyber 
attacks28 at MIT during the fall and winter of 2010, when he 
downloaded approximately 4.7 million copyright-protected 
academic works.29  The word “apparently” instead of “allegedly” is 
used because Swartz himself admitted his responsibility for these 
downloads in his settlement with JSTOR.30  At the time of the 
settlement negotiations, after Swartz’s arrest in 2011, JSTOR knew 
that millions of its articles had been downloaded and was 
desperately trying to ensure that these copyrighted works would 
not be released to the public.31  Swartz sought to alleviate JSTOR’s 
fears by handing over hard drives containing the downloaded 
articles to the Massachusetts USAO, and by assuring JSTOR that 
                                                                                                             
27 Wu, supra note 11; see also Amsden, supra note 12 (“In actuality, the downloads 
were at the time something of an afterthought: an extension of Swartz’s fascination with 
large data sets, his perpetual need to juggle multiple experiments at once.”). 
28 “Cyber attack” is a term with various definitions.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
defines the term as “crimes in which the computer system is the target.  Cyber attacks 
consist of computer viruses (including worms and Trojan horses), denial of service 
attacks, and electronic vandalism or sabotage.” Cybercrime, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS (2005), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=41.  The U.S. 
National Research Council defines cyber-attacks as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, 
deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or 
programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.” NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND 
USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 1 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert 
S. Lin eds., 2009).  Swartz’s actions met both definitions. 
29 See HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., TO THE PRESIDENT: MIT AND THE PROSECUTION OF 
AARON SWARTZ 19–25 (2013) [hereinafter MIT REPORT], available at http://swartz-
report.mit.edu/docs/report-to-the-president.pdf. 
30 Press Release, JSTOR, Misuse Incident and Criminal Case (July 19, 2011) 
[hereinafter JSTOR Press Release], available at http://about.jstor.org/news/jstor-
statement-misuse-incident-and-criminal-case; MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 41. 
31 MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 41. 
2014] FAITH AND MARTYRDOM 1107 
 
no other copies existed, because he had downloaded all of the files 
himself and kept them in his exclusive possession.32 
Assuming that Swartz’s assurances to JSTOR were true, it was 
he who conducted the first cyber attack on JSTOR on or about 
September 25, 2010.33  He entered MIT’s campus, where he had 
never been a student, faculty member, or employee,34 and 
connected his computer to the Institute’s network.35  This first 
action was unremarkable, because MIT at that time maintained an 
open network that allowed any member of the public to enter the 
campus, connect to the internet via the Institute’s provider, and 
take advantage of the information resources, including JSTOR, for 
which the Institute had contracted access.36  The extent of the 
public’s access to resources like JSTOR was limited, in accordance 
with contracts that MIT had signed with these content providers.37  
Users could only access a limited number of articles for limited 
uses—until Aaron Swartz disabled a safeguard in the network.38 
Specifically, Swartz inserted a line of code, also known as a 
“flag,” that modified the access protocol for JSTOR.39  The initial 
access protocol had required that any user requesting to download 
a JSTOR file from the MIT network would have to manually 
confirm that user’s acceptance of JSTOR’s terms of use prior to 
each download.40  Simply put, users had to click a box to indicate 
their agreement prior to each download.41  JSTOR’s terms of 
service prohibited users from automatically downloading articles 
                                                                                                             
32 JSTOR Press Release, supra note 30; MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 42. 
33 JSTOR Press Release, supra note 30; MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 42. 
34 See Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 2; MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 52 
(The MIT Review Panel noted that, if Aaron Swartz had been formally associated with 
MIT, the Institute might have been able to lobby against a federal criminal prosecution by 
informing the USAO that it would handle the matter internally using the Institute’s 
disciplinary system.). 
35 See MIT REPORT supra note 29, at 52; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 4. 
36 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 27. 
37 See Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 4. 
38 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
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in bulk.42  MIT’s terms of service explicitly notified users that 
misuse of its network or those of content partners like JSTOR 
could lead to state or federal prosecution.43  This “click” 
requirement effectively notified users of the legal limits for 
downloading and using JSTOR’s articles, and prevented those 
users from quickly downloading a large number of articles.44 
After neutralizing this safeguard, Swartz’s computer was able 
to run a program that rapidly downloaded thousands of articles.45  
Swartz downloaded so many articles so quickly that his requests 
overloaded a server at JSTOR.46  When JSTOR’s engineers 
realized what was going on, they stopped their server from 
transferring files to the Internet Protocol (IP) address, or the 
physical terminal at MIT, where Swartz had connected his 
computer to the network.47  JSTOR also sent Swartz a message 
indicating that his downloads exceeded JSTOR’s terms of use.48 
Undeterred, Swartz switched to a different IP address and 
continued downloading files.49  Over eleven hours, he managed to 
                                                                                                             
42 Terms and Conditions of Use, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies
/terms.jsp (last visited Apr. 18, 2014); see also Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 
2. 
43 MITnet Rules of Use, MIT, http://ist.mit.edu/network/rules (last visited Apr. 18, 
2014); see also Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 2. 
44 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16 n.2. 
45 See id. at 16; JSTOR Evidence in United States vs. Aaron Swartz, Summary of 
Events, JSTOR (July 30, 2013), http://docs.jstor.org/summary.html [hereinafter JSTOR 
Summary]. 
46 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted 
recipient] (Sept. 26, 2010, 11:01 AM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00028_09-
26-2010.PDF (“We are going to block them at the network level this is too much activity 
for the system.”). 
47 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted 
recipient] (Sept. 25, 2010 8:59 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00003_09-25-
2010.PDF (“[I.P. address] 18.55.6.215 is toast.”). 
48 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted 
recipient] (Sept. 25, 2010 10:04 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00022_09-
25-2010.PDF (“[T]he bad guys aren’t getting PDFs anymore. Just ‘go away’ messages.”). 
49 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 5; 
Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted recipient]  (Sept. 26, 2010, 1:16 PM), available 
at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00032_09-26-2010.PDF (“Unfortunately, it didn’t take long 
for them to switch to another address this time.”). 
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download 450,000 JSTOR articles from 560 academic journals.50  
JSTOR only managed to stop him by denying access to the entire 
Class C network,51 which consisted of all of the IP addresses in the 
building where Swartz had connected his computer.52 
Apparently to hide his identity, Swartz had modified his 
laptop’s media access client (MAC) address to read “ghost laptop,” 
and registered for access to the MIT network under the false name 
“Gary Host,” which prevented MIT from determining who had 
hacked their system.53  However, MIT’s department of Information 
Systems and Technology (IS&T) was able to determine that the 
laptop was not registered to an MIT student, faculty member, or 
employee.54  JSTOR’s service remained disabled at the building 
Swartz used until MIT’s librarians assured JSTOR that the 
offending user had apparently been a guest of the Institute and was 
unlikely to return.55 
Less than two weeks later, Swartz connected to the MIT 
network again and used a new technique to robotically harvest 
JSTOR’s files.56  After downloading each article, Swartz’s 
computer, which also had a disguised user name and MAC 
address, was now programmed to rapidly download an article, 
delete the “cookie” (record of Swartz’s connection to JSTOR), 
disconnect from JSTOR, and then reconnect to download another 
article.57  Swartz also made it appear to JSTOR as if thousands of 
                                                                                                             
50 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16. 
51 “Class C addresses,” IBM.COM, available at http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/
infocenter/aix/v6r1/index.jsp?topic=%2Fcom.ibm.aix.commadmn%2Fdoc%2Fcommadm
ndita%2Faddresses_classc.htm (describing a Class C network as being large enough to 
support 256 local host addresses).  
52 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 17; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted 
recipient] (Sept. 26, 2010, 5:58 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00033_09-
26-2010.PDF (“[A]dded the class c net below to the block and we’ve been in the clear for 
two hours now.”). 
53 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18 n.8; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 
4. 
54 See Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 6. 
55 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 17; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted 
recipient] (Sept. 29, 2010, 4:03 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00038_09-
29-2010.PDF. 
56 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45. 
57 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18 n.9. 
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computers across MIT’s campus were rapidly downloading 
articles.58  These rapid downloads caused a “cascade of failures 
that brought down multiple JSTOR servers.  Half the servers in one 
data center failed, and JSTOR engineers feared that the entire 
service might go down worldwide.”59  To stop the attack, the non-
profit’s engineers shut down JSTOR access to every IP address on 
MIT’s campus—an unprecedented step for JSTOR’s security 
team.60  Thanks to JSTOR’s prompt action, Swartz was only able 
to download about 8,000 articles.61  Meanwhile, no one on the 
Institute’s campus was able to access JSTOR for three days, and 
the Director of the MIT Libraries had to inform the Institute’s 
leaders that the reason for the shut down was “a cyber-attack of the 
JSTOR database.”62 
A few weeks afterward, in late November, Swartz entered MIT 
once again and went into an academic building in the center of the 
campus.63  This time he went into the basement and opened a 
closet containing the building’s network switches.64  The locking 
mechanism on the closet was later found to be broken.65  Swartz 
used a cable to connect his own laptop to the Institute’s network 
using one of these network switches, and hid the laptop under a 
cardboard box on the floor.66  By connecting to a network switch 
in the basement, instead of a computer terminal elsewhere in the 
building, Swartz managed to use MIT’s internet connection 
                                                                                                             
58 See id. at 18. 
59 Id.; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted recipient] (Oct. 9, 2010, 6:14 PM), 
available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00052_10-09-2010.PDF (“About half the servers 
in [redacted] are now broken.”). 
60 See MIT Report, supra note 29, at 18; Email from [redacted sender] to [redacted 
recipient] (Oct. 9, 2010, 10:31 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/J00054_10-09-
2010.PDF. 
61 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 8. 
64 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 
8. 
65 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 
8. 
66 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 
8. 
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without registering as a user at all.67  He could therefore use MIT’s 
network to access the internet (and JSTOR) without any 
supervision by MIT’s information technology administrators.68  
His computer remained there for at least a month, during which 
time he employed a new series of hacks to download 
approximately 4.3 million articles from JSTOR without 
detection.69  In the aftermath of this attack, MIT implemented a 
new access protocol, which prevented any of the Institute’s visitors 
from accessing JSTOR, except from certain monitored computers 
in the MIT libraries.70 
B. The Interests Swartz Threatened, and How the CFAA Defends 
Them 
In his article for The New Yorker, Professor Wu wrote, “Like a 
pie in the face, Swartz’s act was annoying to its victim, but of no 
lasting consequence.”71  JSTOR’s actions and statements at the 
time of the attacks contradict this assertion.  In September 2010, 
JSTOR shut down access to one of MIT’s buildings in response to 
the 450,000-article theft.72  At that time, JSTOR notified MIT that 
Swartz’s activity “clearly indicat[ed] robotic harvesting of PDFs 
[articles] which violates our Terms & Conditions of Use.”73  In 
October, JSTOR denied its service to MIT’s entire campus in 
response to the multiple server crash that occurred during the 
8,000-article theft.74  JSTOR informed MIT that the downloaded 
articles were “not limited to a specific discipline, but were 
sequential across JSTOR’s entire database [which indicated] ‘a 
concerted effort [was] being made to download the entirety of the 
JSTOR archive.”75  Finally, when it detected the 4.3 million-
                                                                                                             
67 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 
4. 
68 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 
4. 
69 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25, 41; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45. 
70 MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 27. 
71 Wu, supra note 11. 
72 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 17; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45. 
73 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 17; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45. 
74 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45. 
75 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18; JSTOR Summary, supra note 45. 
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download attack in December, which brought Swartz’s overall 
theft to approximately eighty percent of JSTOR’s entire archive, 
the non-profit requested that MIT make “every effort . . . to 
identify the individuals responsible and to ensure that the content 
taken in this incident and those previously mentioned is secured 
and deleted.”76  JSTOR described Swartz’s downloads as “extreme 
unauthorized activity . . . malicious and intentional.”77 
JSTOR’s interest in preventing the release of the articles with 
which it was entrusted might seem self-explanatory.  However, the 
repeated assertions, by critics of the prosecution, that Swartz’s 
actions involved “no harm” indicate a need to emphasize the 
interests at stake.  The articles in JSTOR’s archive are the 
intellectual property of their authors and publishers.78  JSTOR 
itself is a non-profit institution.79  It makes digital copies of articles 
from thousands of academic journals, and provides those articles in 
a catalogued, searchable format to subscribers, mostly academic 
institutions, for a fee.80  Some institutions receive free or 
discounted access.81  Schools pay for access to JSTOR’s digital 
copies of articles so that they do not have to acquire, store, or 
digitize documents themselves.82 
As an ethical matter, this means that the information in its 
archive is not JSTOR’s product.  JSTOR does not produce 
anything.  Instead, JSTOR provides a service: digitizing 
information and providing a searchable, accessible source for those 
seeking access to it.  JSTOR provides this service, in its words, to 
“[support] scholarly work and access to knowledge around the 
world.”83  The non-profit pays content providers for access to their 
                                                                                                             
76 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–20, 31–32. 
77 See id. at 20. 
78 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“the owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords”); New to JSTOR? Learn More About Us, 
JSTOR, http://about.jstor.org/10things (last visited Apr. 18, 2014) [hereinafter JSTOR 
About Us]. 
79 See Schwartz, supra note 1; JSTOR About Us, supra note 78. 
80 See Schwartz, supra note 1; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 1. 
81 See Schwartz, supra note 1; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 1. 
82 See Schwartz, supra note 1; JSTOR About Us, supra note 78. 
83 JSTOR Press Release, supra note 27. 
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intellectual property, and makes these valuable documents 
available to “[f]aculty, teachers, and students at more than 7,000 
institutions in 153 countries.”84  JSTOR’s leaders emphasized in 
the non-profit’s press release that as “responsible stewards” of 
their content providers’ works, it is their responsibility to prevent 
unauthorized use.85 
It ought to be self-evident that if all of JSTOR’s articles were 
released online, the non-profit could no longer provide its service.  
That is probably what Aaron Swartz was trying to accomplish.  In 
2008, Swartz published86 a document entitled, “Guerilla Open 
Access Manifesto,” in which he stated that those with access to 
information databases have a moral duty to break copyright laws 
by “trading passwords with colleagues” and “filling download 
requests for friends.”87  He praised those who “have been sneaking 
through holes and climbing over fences, liberating the information 
locked up by the publishers . . . .”88  Swartz criticized the notion 
that such activity is “stealing or piracy, as if sharing a wealth of 
knowledge were the moral equivalent of plundering a ship and 
murdering its crew.”89  He described the copyright laws, which 
prevent these actions, as “unjust” and backed by politicians who 
have been “bought off” by corporations who in turn are “blinded 
by greed.”90  He declared that the time had come to engage in 
“civil disobedience” against the copyright laws. 
                                                                                                             
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 In the aftermath of his suicide, at least one of Swartz’s friends disputed his 
responsibility for the manifesto.  Quinn Norton told the MIT Review Panel that she had 
edited the document and that she was not sure who had written the text that they were 
trying to use to prove his intent, as it had been authored by four people. Quinn Norton, 
Life Inside the Aaron Swartz Investigation, ATLANTIC, Mar. 3, 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/03/life-inside-the-aaron-swartzinv
estigation/273654.  The 580-word manifesto contains a brief byline, which reads in its 
entirety: “Aaron Swartz, July 2008, Eremo, Italy.” Aaron Swartz, Guerilla Open Access 
Manifesto, INTERNET ARCHIVE (July 2008), http://archive.org/stream/
GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto/Goamjuly2008_djvu.txt. 
87 Swartz, supra note 86. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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We need to take information, wherever it is stored, 
make our copies and share them with the world . . .  
We need to buy secret databases and put them on 
the Web.  We need to download scientific journals 
and upload them to file sharing networks.  We need 
to fight for Guerilla Open Access.  With enough of 
us, around the world, we’ll not just send a strong 
message opposing the privatization of knowledge—
we’ll make it a thing of the past.91 
In 2008, Swartz took advantage of a trial period during which 
the United States courts temporarily allowed free access to the 
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) archive, 
which contains documents filed in federal courts.92  Normally 
PACER charges users a small fee per page, which finances the 
collection, scanning, and uploading of records to the PACER 
archive, as well as PACER’s catalogue and search functions.93  In 
2008, however, the federal courts made PACER available for free 
to public libraries.94  Swartz took this opportunity to write a 
program that began downloading all of the documents in the 
PACER archive.95  Doing so, he managed to acquire almost 20 
million pages of records, or twenty percent of PACER’s 
documents, before the courts shut down the libraries’ free access in 
order to stop the bulk downloads.96  Swartz donated all of these 
records to an open government initiative called 
public.resource.org.97  Since the court documents were in the 
public domain and not protected by copyright, the government 
determined that Swartz had not broken any law.98 
One Swartz supporter, whom the MIT Review Panel decided to 
identify publicly as only “a leader in the global movement for open 
                                                                                                             
91 Id. 
92 Schwartz, supra note 1. 
93 How Much Does PACER Cost?, PACER,  http://www.pacer.gov (last visited Apr. 
18, 2014). 
94 See Schwartz, supra note 1; MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 32. 
95 See Schwartz, supra note 1; MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 32. 
96 Schwartz, supra note 1. 
97 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 32. 
98 See id. 
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access to scientific publications,” wrote an email to the President 
of MIT, which indicated that Swartz intended to release JSTOR’s 
documents to the public, just as he had done with the PACER 
documents.99  In an apparent attempt to excuse Swartz’s actions, 
the leader, who confessed a limited knowledge of the American 
justice system, told MIT’s President that: “Aaron Swartz had 
attended a meeting that included a discussion of how much it 
would cost to get JSTOR to open up its archive for the public and 
how that exceeded the funds available to the group at the 
meeting.”100  The leader also wrote of his fear that their 
conversation at that meeting played a role in Aaron Swartz’s 
unfortunate decision to conduct the hack.101 
Other friends and supporters of Swartz suggested that he might 
not have actually intended to release the JSTOR archive to the 
public.  Carl Malamud, the open-government advocate to whom 
Swartz had donated the PACER documents, wrote that he did not 
think Swartz would release the downloaded documents “without a 
great deal of post-download analysis.”102  At least one supporter 
has suggested that Swartz might have downloaded JSTOR’s 
articles only to collect data about the articles, that is, to determine 
the influence of “big money” in scientific research, or how many 
publicly funded scientific studies were being sold or licensed for 
fees by their authors and publishers.103  Swartz had previously 
assisted a law student in conducting a similar study of law journal 
articles.104  JSTOR, however, pointed out that it has made data 
about its articles and their funding available to the public since 
2008 for exactly this purpose, and that it actively participates in 
data-driven studies of its publications: 
                                                                                                             
99 Id. at 71–72. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Carl Malamud, On Crime and Access to Knowledge para. 18 (Mar. 30, 2013) 
(unpublished essay), https://public.resource.org/crime/pamphlet.pdf. 
103 See Lessig on Aaron’s Laws, supra note 12; see also Norton, supra note 86. 
104 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 33 n.18 and accompanying text; see also Shireen 
A. Barday, Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research, and the Legal Profession, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 (2008) (explaining how the author used “Python source code 
extracting all entries (441,170) contained in the Westlaw “Journals and Law Reviews” 
database, including full-text articles”). 
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[W]e support and encourage the legitimate use of 
large sets of content from JSTOR for research 
purposes.  We regularly provide scholars with 
access to content for this purpose.  Our Data for 
Research site (http://dfr.jstor.org) was established 
expressly to support text mining and other projects, 
and our Advanced Technologies Group is an eager 
collaborator with researchers in the academic 
community.105 
Swartz would not have needed to attack MIT’s and JSTOR’s 
network to get the kind of information he acquired for the legal 
journal study. 
It is hard to argue that Aaron Swartz had an innocent reason for 
disabling MIT’s network security protocols and connecting a 
computer hidden in a basement to the Institute’s network switch.  It 
is even harder to make that argument when one notes how close he 
came to downloading the entirety of the JSTOR archive.106  
Swartz’s actions, in fact, fall squarely within the purview of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which clearly prohibits 
modifying a computer network in order to exceed authorized 
use.107  Swartz repeatedly modified MIT’s network security 
protocols, and used the network without authorization by plugging 
directly into the network switch.108  He did so in order to defeat the 
safeguards that would have prevented him from downloading 
millions of articles, which he probably intended to share freely 
with the rest of the world.109  The potential consequences of his 
goal ought to be readily apparent from the actual consequences.  
Whenever Aaron Swartz began robotically harvesting files from a 
document provider, be it PACER or JSTOR, that provider shut 
down its service in order to safeguard its ability to operate.110  This 
                                                                                                             
105 JSTOR Press Release, supra note 30. 
106 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 32. 
107 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012). 
108 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 19–25. 
109 See id. at 16–19. 
110 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 18; see also Email from [redacted sender] to 
[redacted recipient] (Oct. 9, 2010, 10:31 PM), available at http://docs.jstor.org/files/
J00054_10-09-2010.PDF. 
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illustrates the divergence between what he claimed he was doing 
and what he was actually doing: instead of making all information 
free to the public, he was making it impossible to distribute any 
information to the public in a sustainable way. 
When Swartz attempted to robotically harvest the entire 
PACER archive on behalf of public.resource.org, Carl Malamud 
envisioned that his organization might place all of the courts’ 
documents on an “independent server, one that would offer the 
same material but be better organized, easier to search and free, 
anytime and anywhere.”111  No such archive exists, not least 
because neither Malamud nor Swartz had the employees or 
infrastructure to do what PACER and JSTOR do. 
The services that Swartz attacked do not create or even own 
content—they distribute content to the public.112  That distribution 
involves collecting, scanning, digitizing, cataloguing, and 
preparing millions of articles to be searched, accessed, and 
downloaded.113  Those processes cannot happen without time, 
effort, and money.  PACER and JSTOR found a way to collect 
money—not to make a profit, but to enable the processes that 
distribute content.  Aaron Swartz almost stopped them. 
Critics of the CFAA have argued that the law, which was 
originally passed in 1986, does not reflect the reality of modern 
computer usage.114  The most common concern is the law’s 
language prohibiting any use of a computer that “exceeds 
authorized access.”115  This has raised fears about the law’s scope, 
and whether it might criminalize minor or trivial violations of 
software terms of use, which most computer users disregard 
without reading.116  Scholars have suggested that it might even be 
construed to criminalize as felons those employees who use their 
                                                                                                             
111 Amsden, supra note 12. 
112 See JSTOR About Us, supra note 78. 
113 See id. 
114 See Wu, supra note 11, at 2. 
115 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
116 See Kelsey T. Patterson, Narrowing it down to One Narrow View: Clarifying and 
Limiting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 489, 513 (2013); 
see also Lothar Determann, Internet Freedom and Computer Abuse, 35 HASTINGS COMM. 
& ENT. L.J. 429, 430 (2013). 
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work computers to “frolic” on the Internet.117  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning in 
2011 when it affirmed a district court ruling dismissing a CFAA 
charge in United States v. Nosal.118 
Professor Wu cited the Ninth Circuit’s Nosal decision when he 
wrote that the government’s “legal authority” in the Swartz case 
was “shaky.”119  Even if Nosal were binding precedent in the 
District of Massachusetts—which it is not—the case is 
distinguishable from Swartz.  Nosal involved a defendant who 
conspired with employees of an executive-recruiting company to 
steal files from the company.120  At the defendant’s urging, those 
employees accessed their company’s network in a normal, 
authorized manner, but did so in order to improperly transfer 
confidential files to the defendant.121  Chief Judge Kozinski, 
writing for the majority, affirmed the dismissal of the CFAA-
related counts of the Nosal indictment, holding that the CFAA 
cannot apply to “everyone who uses a computer in violation of 
computer use restrictions,” because such an application “may well 
include everyone who uses a computer.”122  Nosal is 
distinguishable from Swartz for several reasons, not least because 
the former did not involve anything that could be characterized as 
a cyber attack.123  Unlike Aaron Swartz, none of the employees 
modified or defeated their company’s network security 
protocols.124  They did not disable a network’s safeguards, nor did 
they surreptitiously seize control of someone else’s computer 
network in order to use that network in a manner for which it was 
not intended.125  Most obviously, they did not create dummy 
accounts, connect unauthorized computers to network switches 
                                                                                                             
117 See Patterson, supra note 116, at 513. 
118 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2012). 
119 Wu, supra note 11. 
120 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 857. 
123 Compare Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856, with Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 3–9. 
124 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16–22; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 
4–8. 
125 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16–22; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 
4–8. 
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hidden in closets, or crash servers.126  They did not attack their 
company’s network.  They just stole files from work—a theft that 
the Court of Appeals acknowledged was a chargeable crime under 
other laws.127 
The CFAA has its faults, including vague language that could 
expose a network user to a severe penalty for minor violations if 
courts or prosecutors interpret the law too broadly.  However, 
when Swartz disabled network security protocols and trespassed on 
MIT property to connect his computer to their network switch, he 
was not like any employee who “frolics” on the internet at work.  
He used MIT’s and JSTOR’s computers against the will of both 
non-profit entities, despite the objections of both, and repeatedly 
overpowered their efforts to resist his penetration and control of 
their systems.  This was not analogous to using a nickname on 
Facebook.  He damaged information systems in order to steal 
millions of copyrighted works.  No revision of the CFAA would 
excuse this conduct.  The United States Constitution itself requires 
the federal government to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”128  Aaron Swartz quite self-consciously attempted to 
deprive content producers of that exclusive right. 
If he had accepted the government’s guilty plea offer, and 
served a few months in prison, it stands to reason that Swartz 
would have emerged with an even greater reputation as a fighter 
for open access.  Perhaps he would have used his notoriety to 
advocate for the amendment of the CFAA, so that defendants 
charged with relatively minor computer crimes—crimes more 
minor than his own—would not face the possibility of years in 
prison.  Instead, it was his death that inspired the bill known as 
“Aaron’s Law” to amend the CFAA.129  As of this writing, the bill 
is before the House Committee on the Judiciary.130  If it passes, 
                                                                                                             
126 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 16–22; Superseding Indictment, supra note 7, at 
4–8. 
127 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863–64. 
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Aaron’s Law would strike the potentially problematic language, 
“exceeds authorized access” from the CFAA, and clarify that the 
crime of “access without authorization” means an act: 
(A) to obtain information on a protected computer; 
(B) that the accesser lacks authorization to obtain; 
and 
(C) by knowingly circumventing one or more 
technological or physical measures that are 
designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized 
individuals from obtaining that information.131 
In their press release announcing the bill, Aaron’s Law drafters 
Representative Zoe Lofgren and Senator Ron Wyden were careful 
not to claim that such revisions to the CFAA would prevent 
prosecution of acts like Swartz’s sustained attacks on MIT and 
JSTOR.132  Swartz, of course, circumvented, manipulated, and 
disabled a number of physical and technological safeguards in 
order to obtain copyrighted intellectual property against JSTOR’s 
and MIT’s expressed objections and despite their concerted efforts 
to stop him.133  Aaron’s Law would not legalize such activity. 
C. Neither MIT’s Neutrality Nor JSTOR’s Later Opposition 
Rendered Prosecution Unjust 
Several critics of the prosecution have pointed out that JSTOR 
and MIT, the alleged victims of Swartz’s crimes, declined to press 
charges against him.134  Such criticism overlooks the vigor with 
which JSTOR asserted and defended its own intellectual property 
rights, resisted his attacks on its network, demanded that he be 
identified and stopped, and condemned his actions until the 
moment JSTOR received its property back along with assurances 
that he would no longer harm JSTOR’s interests.135  It also 
overlooks the possibility that the threat of a criminal penalty 
                                                                                                             
131 Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013). 
132 See Lofgren & Wyden, supra note 19. 
133 See supra notes 34–70 and accompanying text. 
134 See Wu, supra note 11 (“Among the most frustrating components of the ordeal was 
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charges against Swartz after he returned the downloaded documents.”). 
135 See JSTOR Press Release, supra note 30. 
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allowed JSTOR to demand the return of its property from Swartz, 
or, conversely, that Swartz withheld JSTOR’s property until his 
lawyers extracted from the non-profit a promise that it would not 
seek his prosecution.136 
All of this runs counter to the idea that JSTOR actually 
believed Aaron Swartz had done nothing wrong.  Indeed, JSTOR’s 
increasingly agitated complaints throughout the months of 
Swartz’s cyber attacks belie the notion.  In September 2010, 
JSTOR asserted that Swartz’s first attacks “clearly” violated its 
terms of use.137  A JSTOR administrator described the attack as an 
“extreme case,” using a download pattern that was “terribly 
efficient, but not terribly subtle,” and necessitating the largest 
service blockage (denying service to entire Class C range) that the 
administrator had ever seen in his tenure.138 
In October 2010, JSTOR concluded that the server-crashing 
attacks were a “concerted effort” to download its entire archive.139  
In December 2010, JSTOR described the multi-million-download 
attacks as “malicious and intentional.”140  Another JSTOR 
administrator suggested on December 26 that if JSTOR and MIT 
could not stop the attacks, they might have to call the FBI.141  In 
June of 2011, when JSTOR informed MIT that Swartz had handed 
over the downloaded files to the Boston USAO, it described the 
files as “stolen records.”142 
As for MIT, the Institute maintained a stance of “neutrality” 
throughout the prosecution, and even after Swartz’s death 
reiterated its compelling reasons for not opposing the prosecution: 
Aaron Swartz had used MIT’s premises and 
network to allegedly commit crimes, he had 
adversely affected MIT’s relationship with JSTOR, 
                                                                                                             
136 See MIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 41. 
137 Id. at 17. 
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and he had seriously inconvenienced MIT’s 
Libraries, MIT researchers, and students seeking to 
use JSTOR, and MIT’s IS&T personnel who 
repeatedly tried to stop his misuse of MIT’s 
network.  MIT felt no sense of obligation toward 
someone who had abused the open access privileges 
it had provided for the convenience of guests, even 
if that abuse was carried out in the name of open 
access.143 
MIT’s Review Panel further observed that opposing the 
prosecution might indicate to the public that the Institute was not 
serious about contracts with licensors or the integrity of its 
network.144 
But setting all of that aside for a moment, and assuming 
arguendo that JSTOR or MIT had expressed a completely genuine 
desire that Swartz not be punished, such a desire would not 
necessarily compel the government to drop the charges.  In the first 
place, these parties’ supposed absolution could not encompass the 
feelings of every single academic, author, and publisher who 
entrusted them with their intellectual property.  Indeed, neither 
JSTOR nor MIT are the owners or publishers of the intellectual 
property that Swartz stole.145  Furthermore, when authorities 
encounter remarkably forgiving-crime victims, these victims’ 
desire to turn the other cheek, and who conscientiously object to 
the imposition of criminal penalties, does not stand in the way of 
the government enforcing its laws.146  In the case of intellectual 
property, prosecutors have a clear constitutional and statutory duty 
to prevent theft.147 
AUSA Heymann, the lead prosecutor, indicated to MIT’s 
Office of General Counsel that he had considered JSTOR’s and 
                                                                                                             
143 Id. at 55. 
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MIT’s positions on the matter.148  However, he also indicated that 
he had to consider deterring others from committing similar 
crimes.149  Swartz seemed to be making a bold stand, the kind of 
civil disobedience that could certainly impress anyone who 
opposes intellectual property per se.  That stand was also 
audacious for a very serious reason: he had poked the United 
States government in the eye, deliberately undermining the 
intellectual property rights that the government is constitutionally 
bound to defend.150 
It is possible, however, that Swartz was completely unaware of 
the seriousness of his actions until after his arrest.  When MIT 
Police accosted Swartz after catching him on camera changing the 
hard drive on the basement computer, Swartz responded that he 
“didn’t speak with strangers.”151  He then stated that MIT Police 
are not “real cops,” and fled.152  Shortly thereafter, two MIT Police 
officers and a United States Secret Service agent apprehended 
Swartz.153  His friend Quinn Norton and attorney Elliott Peters 
both told the MIT Review Panel that Swartz was “shocked” by his 
arrest.154  Norton said Swartz “didn’t regard what he had done as a 
big deal and was surprised that people were making so much of 
it.”155 
Such a perspective would be remarkably obtuse, especially for 
the man who wrote with such passion about the forces arrayed 
against him in the worldwide battle for open access.156  Regardless 
of whether Swartz understood the magnitude of his actions, the 
fact remained that almost five million copyrighted works, which 
derived their monetary value from the limits on their distribution, 
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had come within a few keystrokes of being lost.  A non-profit that 
funds research and makes information available across the world 
was almost put out of business.  This was all in addition to the 
JSTOR servers that crashed under the weight of Swartz’s attacks, 
the efforts of JSTOR and MIT employees to identify and repel his 
attacks, and the days that MIT’s students and faculty went without 
access to JSTOR’s resources in the aftermath of those attacks.  If 
there was anything that could reasonably prevent the government 
from seeking imprisonment for Aaron Swartz, JSTOR’s supposed 
absolution was not it. 
CONCLUSION: MISSED SIGNALS 
The United States has a long and cherished history of civil 
disobedience, of true believers who openly challenge the status 
quo.  To some, Aaron Swartz was such a freedom fighter: 
In another time, a man with Swartz’s dark drive 
would have headed to the frontier.  Perhaps he 
would have ventured out into the wilderness, like T. 
E. Lawrence or John Muir . . . .  Swartz possessed a 
self-destructive drive toward actions that felt right 
to him, but that were also defiant and, potentially, 
law-breaking.  Like Henry David Thoreau, he 
chased his own dreams, and he was willing to 
disobey laws he considered unjust.157 
One might say the same of Jeremy Hammond, a hacker who 
pled guilty in 2013 to attacking the networks of corporations, 
government agencies, and law enforcement advocacy groups.158  
At his sentencing in the Southern District of New York, Hammond 
described his attacks as “acts of civil disobedience” against 
government surveillance and corporate complicity.159  After he was 
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sentenced to 10 years in prison, he raised a fist in the air and 
yelled, “Long live Anonymous!” and  “Hurrah for anarchy!” while 
being escorted from the courtroom.160  To some observers, Aaron 
Swartz might have seemed like another Jeremy Hammond, but the 
evidence indicates that Swartz was a very different young man.  At 
least one commentator has suggested that Swartz rejected the 
Government’s offers of minimal sentence guidelines during plea 
negotiations because he could not bear the thought of being a 
felon.161 
There was another, more serious problem.  Six years before his 
suicide, friends and readers posted the following messages on 
Swartz’s blog in response to a short story he had published: 
“Hey Aaron, You’re scaring me here.  Please s[t]ick 
around and talk to us.  You can always die later.  
There’s no rush.” 
“Jeez, Aaron—get some help.  Now.  Suicides talk 
about it before they do it.” 
“Aaron, you’re scaring me.  You’re one of the most 
brilliant people around and you have a bright 
future.” 
“Hey Aaron—I’m a little worried here.  Please heed 
the above advice.  Let me know if I can help.”162 
The short story that inspired these messages, “A Moment 
Before Dying,” describes a young man and his struggles with 
depression shortly before he commits suicide.163  Swartz’s friends 
took the post so seriously—the title character in the original 
version was named “Aaron”—that one of them called the police.164  
Swartz also blogged explicitly about his own struggles with 
depression, quoting writer George Scialabba to describe his 
condition: 
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[A]cute depression does not feel like falling ill, it 
feels like being tortured . . . the pain is not 
localized; it runs along every nerve, an 
unconsuming fire . . . .  Even though one knows 
better, one cannot believe that it will ever end, or 
that anyone else has ever felt anything like it.165 
Other posts in the blog reveal Swartz to be a sensitive, 
thoughtful, brilliant young man who reveled in discussing a diverse 
variety of topics, from economic theory to popular films.  Frequent 
themes in the blog included individuals who challenge the status 
quo and the death of such individuals, including by suicide.  These 
themes appeared in Swartz’s last three blog posts, the first of 
which he published on September 25, 2012. 
This third-to-last post was a mostly academic discussion of 
labor relations and productivity in the automotive industry, and 
specifically considered how managers might motivate their 
workers to follow instruction.166  After a detailed historical and 
philosophical discussion of organizational theory and the effects of 
economic incentives, Swartz concluded the post with the 
following: 
When you’re upset with someone, all you want to 
do is change the way they’re acting.  But you can’t 
control what’s inside a person’s head.  Yelling at 
them isn’t going to make them come around, it’s 
just going to make them more defiant . . . .  No, you 
can’t force other people to change.  You can, 
however, change just about everything else.  And 
usually, that’s enough.167 
Perhaps this offers a glimpse into the mind of a man who 
turned down a zero-to-six months sentence, after admitting to the 
charged conduct and knowing that he would likely spend seven 
years in prison if he went to trial. 
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Any evaluation of the decisions preceding Aaron Swartz’s 
death bears the inevitable tinge of hindsight.  As the MIT Report 
put it, “[H]ow does one maintain a perspective uncolored by the 
shock and tragedy of Aaron Swartz’s suicide[?]”168  It would not 
be fair to blame anyone for failing to realize the seriousness of 
Swartz’s condition.  His partner, Stinebrickner-Kauffman, said, “I 
don’t think any of us actually realized how much of a toll it had 
taken, until later, until after he died.  He hid it from us well.”169 
Nevertheless, Swartz’s attorneys were apparently concerned 
about his mental health.  Andy Good, the first lawyer who 
represented Swartz in the prosecution, told the Boston Globe, “I 
told Heymann [that Swartz] was a suicide risk . . . .  [Heymann’s] 
reaction was a standard reaction in that office, not unique to Steve.  
He said, ‘Fine, we’ll lock him up.’ . . . [T]hey were aware of the 
risk, and they were heedless.”170  At least one Swartz supporter 
raised the issue with MIT’s President.171  The aforementioned 
“leader in the global movement for open access to scientific 
publications,” wrote that a term in prison would be “fateful, 
unbearable, in the worst case, deadly” for Swartz.172 
If it were indeed the case that any prosecutor reacted callously 
or flippantly to a warning that Aaron Swartz’s life was in danger, 
such a reaction would certainly be the subject of bitter regret.  The 
Central District of California has recently implemented a program 
to allow prosecutors and others to take steps to mitigate a mentally 
ill defendant’s risk to himself and others.173  The District Court, 
working together with the federal defender’s office and a mental 
health provider, crafted a resource program that helps defendants 
manage their symptoms of anxiety, depression, and suicidal 
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thoughts, all while protecting their right against self-
incrimination.174  The program includes crisis intervention, support 
groups, instruction on healthy coping skills, cognitive behavioral 
therapy, and lessons on keys to successful incarceration.175 
Similar options are also available to defense attorneys.  In fact, 
the Boston Bar Association hosted an event in November 2013 
entitled “Recognizing and Responding to Suicidal Persons: What 
Lawyers Need to Know.”176  The event included a panel discussion 
by defense attorneys, prosecutors, and mental health professionals, 
and the event program provided a directory of mental health 
resources and advice for attorneys.177  Given that prosecutors 
might naturally question a defense attorney’s suggestion that his 
client should not be punished for health reasons, it is even more 
important that defense attorneys be proactive in monitoring and 
safeguarding a defendant’s mental health, especially when the 
defendant is not under government confinement. 
If nothing else, Aaron Swartz’s story is a cause for reflection 
for all who exercise power over people, machines, or networks.  
Swartz was born with astounding intellectual gifts, which he 
developed at a young age into a remarkable power to manipulate 
networked systems.  He wielded his power irresponsibly, and in 
doing so, he made himself the target of a government whose power 
is unmatched in history.  It appears that Aaron Swartz found, quite 
reasonably, that it is extremely stressful to confront such a power. 
The prosecutors in the Massachusetts USAO, who exercise 
power on behalf of the government, have certainly been unjustly 
accused of many things in the wake of Swartz’s death.  However, a 
sense of perspective is important here.  As awful as it must be for 
any public servant to face false or unfair accusations in public, how 
much worse must it have been for that young man, alone in his 
Brooklyn apartment, confronting the awesome power of the 
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government by himself?  There can be little doubt that, misguided 
as he was, he never stopped wanting to make the world a better 
place. 
The epigraph to this Note is from Oscar Wilde’s novel about a 
young man who kills himself in a desperate attempt to draw 
support for his own discredited scholarly theory.178  In the quoted 
passage, the narrator is addressing a man named Erskine, a friend 
of the deceased, who refuses to publish the dead man’s theory due 
to its lack of literary support.179  Appalled, the narrator pleads with 
Erskine to publish the theory, saying, “[A]nd if you will not tell of 
his martyrdom, tell at least of his faith.”180  Erskine is adamant that 
the young man’s suicide lends no credence to his theory: “a thing 
is not necessarily true because a man dies for it.”181 
Aaron Swartz’s suicide does not reflect the justice or injustice 
of the CFAA, but Swartz’s theories about the importance of access 
to scholarship will live on regardless of whether the government 
acted justly in attempting to punish him.182  His ideas will endure 
because in Swartz’s short but exceptional life he earned the love 
and admiration of relatives, friends, and supporters around the 
world.183  Those supporters have spoken and written much about 
what they regard as his martyrdom184 and they may understandably 
resent this Note’s assertion that Swartz was not the victim of the 
injustices they have alleged.  It is therefore appropriate to give the 
last word to Swartz’s family, who wrote not just of his martyrdom, 
but also of his faith: 
Aaron’s insatiable curiosity, creativity, and 
brilliance; his reflexive empathy and capacity for 
selfless, boundless love; his refusal to accept 
injustice as inevitable—these gifts made the world, 
and our lives, far brighter.  We’re grateful for our 
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time with him, to those who loved him and stood 
with him, and to all of those who continue his work 
for a better world.185 
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